Abstract
I.

INTRODUCTION
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In view of the tariff's importance as an instrument of Korea's trade policy, some relatively simple summary and complementary tariff indicators are described in the next section; they are designed to reflect the level and structure of tariffs. The existence of tariff "spikes" in certain sectors constitutes prima facie evidence that the domestic deadweight efficiency and net welfare losses caused by tariff protection as well as the costs to consumers could be high. 1 Estimates of tariff indicators for Korea are reported in Section III; these estimates are derived from a data base constructed by the WTO. 2 Some non-tariff barriers to trade are also discussed briefly. The final section contains some concluding remarks including a caveat.
II. METHODOLOGY CONCERNING TARIFF INDICATORS
The structure of Korea's customs tariff is relatively complex. The general schedule for 2000 consisted of 11,169 tariff lines (at the ten-digit HS level), 2.8% more than in 1996, and a multiplicity of duties involving 125 different rates (96 ad valorem rates levied on the c.i.f. value of imports, 11 specific and 18 alternate rates) 3 ; however, about 61% of tariff lines (mostly those pertaining to industrial goods)
are set at a rate of 8%. In order to enhance the transparency of the Korean tariff schedule, attention is focused on a few summary indicators that capture the key features of its existing tariff structure and help to identify those groups of products for which the potential distortions in consumption and production patterns are likely to be greatest. There are a number of important conceptual issues related to the construction of summary tariff indicators, notable among which are: (a) the appropriate tariff rate; (b) the weights, if any, used for aggregation purposes; and (c) the appropriate indicators of dispersion in tariff rates.
(a) Tariff rate A clear distinction should be made between the nominal (or statutory) tariff rate and the collected tariff rate. The latter is the amount of customs duties as a proportion of the value of a given group of imported products. It thus reflects the average transfer to the government from domestic consumers of the products subject to duty. However, the collected tariff rate does not necessarily bear any relation to the "marginal" tariff rate, which is the most appropriate indicator of the potential dead-weight (efficiency) losses caused by duties. In particular, it ignores prohibitive tariffs that do 1 Dead-weight losses to consumers and producers are only one of a number of channels through which trade restrictions may affect net economic welfare. Other channels include gains or losses from rent shifting between countries, losses associated with rent-seeking activities, possible gains from improved terms of trade, gains or losses in scale economies, changes in product variety, and reduced diffusion of technology.
2 This data base includes measures affecting imports, not those affecting exports. 3 Whereas ad valorem duties are calculated as a constant proportion of the value-for-duty of the imported good, specific duties are expressed as a fixed monetary amount per physical unit or per unit of weight of the product imported, so that the associated degree of protection (or implicit assistance) is not independent of not yield any revenues at all. As a consequence, collected tariff rates are not usually regarded as reliable indicators of the potentially distorting effects of the tariff structure on domestic resource allocation.
The simplest and most straight forward nominal tariff rate to use is the applied MFN rate. The latter should be distinguished from the bound MFN rate, which is usually the highest rate of applied duty permissible under a country's schedule of commitments at the WTO. 4 (GATT/WTO tariff negotiations involve primarily the binding of tariff rates and reductions therein.) Not all tariffs are bound, so that in some instances bound rates do not exist. The applied MFN rate, in contrast to the collected tariff rate, excludes preferential rates and exemptions. The greater the use of preferences and exemptions, the greater the difference between the applied MFN rate, or average, and the collected rate. The nominal MFN rates actually applied may be viewed as an indicator of the maximum nominal degree of tariff protection against imports originating in WTO Members. If imports of a particular tariff item from all sources are perfect substitutes for each other, however, the existence of significant amounts of imports subject to the MFN rate constitutes evidence that this particular rate may in fact be the relevant marginal rate for the purpose of analysing the potentially distorting effects of those tariffs that are actually applied. The granting of preferential rates tends merely to compensate those suppliers for their cost disadvantage, and does not result in trade creation (that is, increased imports from all suppliers). In such a situation, the provision of preferential rates or exemptions is purely trade diverting because it changes the composition of a country's imports from different sources without affecting the total volume of imports.
5 The tariff-inclusive prices of imports from all sources would be the same, that is, the MFN-inclusive price. 6 Thus, the tariff averages reported in Section III are based largely on nominal applied MFN rates.
In contrast to the nominal tariff rate, the effective tariff rate focuses on value added and takes into account tariffs levied on imported inputs (allowing for industry-specific tariff concessions). Insofar as domestic industry uses inputs that are subject to duty, the nominal tariff rate applied to imports of a particular commodity is not an indicator of the effective rate of protection. The extent to which value added is protected is a more accurate indicator of the potential distortion in domestic resource allocation. Unfortunately, indicators involving effective tariff rates require much more data than those based on nominal rates.
the import price and can therefore change independently of the tariff rate. Alternate duties involve either specific or ad valorem rates, whichever is greater. 4 Bound tariffs can be exceeded, but only in special circumstances. These circumstances are specified in Article XXVIII of the GATT. 5 The emphasis on MFN rates is consistent with the emphasis on the domestic impact of tariff protection. Preferential rates are relevant for the determination of the impact of tariffs on bilateral trade flows and thus in evaluating the effects of tariffs on global trade patterns and resource allocation. As regards the choice of weighting method for purposes of computing nominal tariff averages, there are problems with all available schemes. Averages can vary considerably depending on the weights used. The main drawback of the simple (unweighted) arithmetic average of the tariff rates is that it takes no account of the relative importance of various products.
Among the main alternatives to simple averages are the shares of imports or of domestic production.
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The use of actual import volumes assigns a small weight to the highly-protected products, however, thus tending to underestimate the degree of protection.
8 Furthermore, the use of variable-import weights can result in spurious movements in weighted averages over time as the weights themselves would tend to be inversely related to a country's tariff rates. By contrast, although the use of actual domestic production weights over-represents highly-protected products, it avoids the spurious movements often associated with variable-import weights.
As none of the viable weighting methods is free from drawbacks, with each method giving rise to some aggregation bias, both simple (unweighted) and constant import-share-weighted averages are reported in this paper. The latter involved the composition/shares of overall import values for the OECD (of which Korea is a Member) in 1998. 9 Needless to say, it is unlikely that the composition of Korean imports in the absence of tariffs (or NTBs) would resemble the average for the OECD (which also reflects trade distortions). Moreover, while use of OECD import weights to some extent avoids the downward bias inherent in countries' "own" import weights, some bias remains insofar as the levels and structure of their tariffs are similar. Thus, even weighted tariff averages based on overall OECD imports need to be interpreted cautiously.
Interestingly, both simple and import-share-weighted averages have been used in relation to GATT/WTO negotiations. Import-weighted averages are used by the GATT/WTO as an indicator of progress in achieving MFN tariff reductions. By contrast, commitments to reduce agricultural tariffs 6 On the other hand, if the country subject to the preferential rate can fully satisfy the demand for the imported item, then the preferential rate rather than the MFN rate would be the marginal rate. 7 The ideal weights to use in calculating import-weighted or production weighted averages are obviously the values of imports or production in the absence of barriers. Unfortunately, these values are unobservable. If one is interested in effective rates of protection, weights should be based on domestic value-added rather than domestic production weights.
8 No weight at all is given to prohibitive tariffs.
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9 In fact, OECD import weights are available only at the 6-digit level (or higher) of the Harmonized System (HS). As a consequence, tariff rates are aggregated in the form of simple averages from the national tariff line (10-digit level, for example) to the common 6-digit level. Thus, OECD import-weighted tariff averages at the 6-digit level and above are in fact hybrids of simple and import-weighted averages.
following the "tariffication" exercise agreed in the UR are measured in terms of simple averages (presumably on simplicity grounds and also because some tariffs may have been prohibitive).
(c) Dispersion index
The dead-weight losses associated with Korea's tariff structure depend not just on average tariff rates, but on the variation in these rates across products. The higher the dispersion in tariff rates, particularly within groups of similar and, thus, highly substitutable products, the greater the likelihood that consumers' and producers' decisions are distorted by the tariff structure. 11 The dispersion also provides an indication of the complexity of the tariff schedule as well as the potential inequities it embodies as far as consumers are concerned.
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Among the most commonly used indicators of dispersion are the standard deviation (SD) and the coefficient of variation (CV), both of which are related to each other. The SD is a statistical measure of the absolute dispersion between items in a frequency distribution. The CV measures relative dispersion by dividing the SD by the average tariff rate. SDs and CVs can be computed not just for all products, but also for various groups and sub-groups of products. If products within a given group face widely different tariff rates, this can result in large changes in their relative prices. 13 Large changes in relative prices constitute a potentially serious source of distortion to domestic consumption and production patterns. Relatively high risk groups of products may be considered to be those for which the SD or CV is especially large. What matters for resource allocation, however, are the tariff-inclusive prices of imported products and thus the absolute magnitudes of tariffs as well as differences therein. This suggests that, from the resource allocation standpoint, the SD is a more appropriate indicator of potential economic distortion than the CV.
An additional indicator of dispersion is the number (or proportion) of items for which the tariff rate exceeds a reference level. 14 The reference level may, for example, be a specified multiple of the overall domestic average tariff rate. Tariff rates in excess of the given domestic reference level are referred to as domestic "spikes". The "spikier" a country's tariff schedule, the greater the potentially 10 Interestingly, as required by the GATT/WTO, recent adjustments in the EU tariff in order to compensate non-Member countries for the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden were based on "collected" tariff averages for various groups of products.
11 Strictly speaking, a uniform nominal tariff (or a uniformly restrictive NTB) minimises the net welfare cost of such protection only if import demand elasticities are uniform across commodities and cross-price effects are negligible. Tariff uniformity may be desirable on administrative simplicity and political grounds, however. For a discussion of these and related matters, see Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) .
12 Moreover, the larger the dispersion in tariff rates applicable to various products, the greater the incentive for exporters and importers to reclassify products so that they are subject to lower tariffs.
13 Imperfectly competitive pricing (or rising marginal costs under perfect competition) may mean that the domestic price does not increase by the full amount of the tariff, in which case, there will be a gain in the terms of trade for the importing country. Indicators 9) to 12) capture the domestic dispersion in applied MFN tariff rates across products. The simple average bound tariff rate has fallen from 27.6% in 1996 to 20.1% in 2000, and is to drop further to about 17% by 2004, thereby substantially narrowing the gap between bound and applied rates (see below). The fall in average bound rate levels can be attributed, inter alia, to changes with respect to motor vehicles (namely a cut in the bound rate from 80% to 8% as of 11 March 1999) together with telecommunications and information related equipment (zero rate by the year 2000, except for certain items); these changes resulted from the 1998 automotive negotiations with the United States (but were extended to other WTO Members on an MFN basis) and the 1996 WTO Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information and Technology (ITA). 19 Prohibitive binding levels (ad valorem and alternate rates) ranging from 100.5% to 887.4% (manioc), affect more than 100 agricultural and livestock items owing to the "tariffication" exercise. 16 For agricultural items, UR reductions in bound tariffs are being implemented in equal annual instalments over the period 1995-2004; for other items, implementation may take from 5 to 15 years (as in the case of tariff harmonisation of chemical products) depending on the base rate. ITA tariff cuts will be fully implemented in 2004. 17 This share reflects product coverage under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture; that is, HS Chapters 1 to 24 (excluding fish and fish products) and certain agricultural raw materials or semi-manufactures. Unbound items involve rice and rice products and several fish items.
18 Unbound items cover: some fisheries products, wood, petroleum, chemicals (medicaments), apparel, fabricated metals (ball bearings), machinery (gas turbines, electric motors and generators, refrigeration equipment, data processing units, etc.), electronics products (radio and television receivers, capacitors, resistors), motor vehicles, maritime vessels and photographic equipment. 8 19 The ITA, which was agreed at the Singapore Ministerial Conference and has 31 participants (1999), provides for the elimination of customs duties and other duties and charges on computers, telecom equipment, semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, software, and scientific instruments, on an MFN basis; the phase-in of tariff reductions was set in four equal cuts (25% each time) starting in July 1997. The ITA does not cover consumer electronic goods. In 1995, Korea was the world's 5th leading exporter and 8th leading importer in IT goods. 
Duty-free items
In 2000, only 6.7% of Korea's tariff lines were duty-free, albeit more than three times as many as in 1996 (Table 1 and Chart 1). This proportion is expected to rise further to 13.3% once the Uruguay Round and ITA commitments are fully implemented. Full implementation of the ITA will remove duties on more than 13% of tariff lines, a significant increase compared to 1996.
(c) Specific and alternate duties Specific and alternate duties currently account for only 0.5% of all tariff lines, the same as in 1996.
The use of such duties, which can conceal high ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) and be more distorting than ad valorem tariffs, is therefore low compared to other major traders, notable the "Quad"; such duties apply to 6.9% of tariff lines in the case of Japan (see Annex In the case of the U.S. and EU, the corresponding percentages are nearly 13% and 10%, respectively. 21 These AVEs were computed as collected duty rates; as explained earlier collected duty rates tend to underestimate the true AVEs.
22 Accordingly, restraints on imports of 37 items were eliminated on 1 July 1997. Since then, most of these items have been subject only to a tariff; 6 items are subject to tariff quotas with high "out-of-quota" rates.
In accordance with Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, products subject to tariff quotas may also be subject to special safeguard provisions. 24 Under these provisions, a safeguard allowing for an additional duty of up to a third of the level of the applied tariff may be applied.
"Autonomous" tariff quotas
In addition to WTO-related agricultural tariff quotas, Korea has continued to grant concessional access through "autonomous" tariff quotas, usually for raw materials, inputs, semi-processed goods, components, parts and engines (61 four-digit HS items in 2000). The purpose of these measures is apparently to stabilise the domestic prices of such items. Under the Korean Customs Act, the in-quota rate may be 40% above or below the basic/general rate, while the out-of-quota rate may be 40% above the basic/general rate. As of July 1999, all in-quota rates have been below the basic/general rate.
(e) Level of MFN tariff protection
Between 1996 and 2000, the simple average applied MFN tariff rate fell from 14.4% to 13.8%. The OECD trade-weighted average also dropped slightly, from 10.9% to 10.6%. However, during the same period, tariff protection for certain food items, canned fruit and vegetables, oils and fats, sugar, textiles and electrical appliances and houseware increased. The applied MFN tariff average for agricultural products is 50.3% (2000), more than seven times the average for industrial products (7.5%). This level of tariff protection for agricultural products is to some extent due to "tariffication" under the Uruguay Round, which eliminated agricultural NTBs. The simple average is expected to fall to 12.7% once the Uruguay Round tariff cuts for both agricultural and industrial (including ITA items) products are fully implemented.
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The substantial gap between applied and bound rates -the simple averages are 13.8% versus 20.1% -imparts an element of uncertainty to Korea's tariff. This gap has declined since 1996, however, mainly as a consequence of the substantial fall in bound rates. The difference between average applied and bound rates in 2000 was much higher for industrial products than for agricultural products (Charts 2 and 3). Applied MFN tariff rates for several (mostly manufactured) items will have to come down as they currently exceed the bound rates that will obtain once the Uruguay Round is fully implemented.
24 Korea has used such provisions against certain beans, buckwheat, ground nuts, wheat starch, and sweet potato starch.
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25 Tariff indicators reflecting full implementation of the Uruguay Round and ITA are based solely on bound rates because one cannot be certain about future applied rates (except to assume that they should not exceed bound rates).
Interestingly, the average rate of customs duty collected on total imports (the collected tariff rate) was only 2.9% in 1998. This is not only considerably lower than the rate of 4.4% in 1996, but also less than one-quarter of the average applied MFN rate. 26 The large and growing gap between the average applied MFN rate and the collected duty rate can be explained, inter alia, by reduced in-quota rates under tariff quotas, the non-importation of items subject to prohibitive duties, duty concessions/exemptions and, to a lesser extent, by trade preferences, which mitigate the burden of tariffs on certain items and on imports of products from certain countries.
The potential efficiency losses associated with the customs tariff depend not just on the average applied MFN tariff rates, but also on the dispersion of those rates across products. The higher the dispersion in tariff rates, particularly within groups of similar and, thus, highly substitutable products, the greater the likelihood that consumers' and producers' decisions are distorted by the tariff structure. 27 The dispersion also provides an indication of the complexity of the tariff schedule.
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Judging from the four summary indicators (9-12) of tariff dispersion reported in Table 1 as well as in Chart 3, the dispersion in applied MFN tariff rates has hardly changed since 1996 despite the high compression of 6,800 tariff lines under the 8% duty rate in 1997. In 2000, imports of five 10-digit HS96 items (involving manioc) bear the highest ad valorem tariff of 926.8%, nine items (certain cereals and inulin) are subject to the second highest rate of 835.9% and sorghum for seed is levied at the third highest rate of 814%; about 84 items (agricultural, food, and chemicals) are subject to rates ranging from 105% to 787.8%.
Judging by the coefficient of variation (CV), the dispersion in Korean tariffs has been slightly reduced from 4 in 1996 to 3.9 in 2000; however, it is expected to rise to 4.1 once the Uruguay Round and ITA undertakings are fully implemented. (The standard deviation (SD) shows a steady declining trend.)
The percentages of tariffs involving domestic and international tariff "spikes" show a similar trend; a complete distribution of MFN tariff rates is depicted in Charts 3 and 4. Tariff spikes affect mainly the same broad product categories whose average tariffs are the highest; clearly, their elimination would further reduce the dispersion in tariff rates. The lower the dispersion in tariff rates, the less the potential distortion in the allocation of domestic resources caused by tariffs. 26 An explanation may be that in 1998, when imports contracted, items subject to high duties (i.e. prohibitive rates) were not imported. 27 Strictly speaking, a uniform nominal tariff minimizes the net welfare cost of such protection only if import demand elasticities are uniform across commodities and cross-price effects are negligible. Tariff uniformity may be desirable on administrative simplicity and political grounds, however. For a discussion of these and related matters, see Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) . for these industries, the domestic production of raw materials and inputs receives more protection than subsequent production stages.
Korea has maintained legislative provisions allowing for the application of temporarily higher duties, measures termed "flexible" tariffs, within the limit of WTO bindings. In addition to autonomous tariff quotas, these measures include adjustment duties, special emergency duties and seasonal duties.
Adjustment duties have been applied with a view, inter alia, to strengthening "temporarily" border protection for less-competitive domestic goods, or counteracting the impact of increased imports of items competing with vulnerable domestic items (e.g. agricultural, forest, livestock and marine products). After reaching a peak of 80 items in 1997, product coverage (mainly fish, rice, sugar, wood and textile articles, bicycles, toys) has gradually declined to 28 items in 2000; ad valorem rates have ranged from 1.3 to 10 times the item's general tariff level, and peaked at 100% (certain fish) in
1998.
A seasonal customs duty may be charged for goods whose price varies depending on the season with a view to protecting the domestic market and industry against imports of the same, similar or substitute goods; this duty may be either a higher rate than the basic rate (with the higher rate being equivalent to the difference between domestic and foreign prices), or a lower rate (equivalent to 40% of the basic duty Preferential tariff treatment may expand in the coming years. Although Korea has traditionally eschewed regional or bilateral trading arrangements, it is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Chile. Moreover, it is considering the possibility of similar agreements with Japan and Thailand.
In view of the fact that the average level of MFN tariff protection in Japan is less than half the level of Korea (see Annex), Japan probably has more to gain from such an agreement than Korea. As free trade agreements between Korea and Japan should cover substantially all trade in order to be consistent with the WTO rules, there would also be the thorny issue of how agriculture would be handled.
(j) Customs clearance procedures Customs clearance requirements have been eased mainly through immediate release and paperless import clearance systems. Computerised customs clearance for imports (and exports) is now in operation.
Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
Korea's non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade currently involve, inter alia, import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions, tax measures, state-trading operations (mainly in agriculture and livestock), discriminatory government procurement practices and standards requirements. In addition, Korea, like other WTO Members, has several types of contingency measures at its disposal, namely countervailing and anti-dumping duties as well as safeguards. These measures are designed to counteract "unfair" trade practices, such as export subsidies and the dumping of products onto the Korean market. The Government's toleration of anti-competitive practices by large domestic conglomerates (chaebols) and state-owned enterprises may also constitute a barrier to trade.
Furthermore, frugality campaigns (although they have officially ceased) and a deeply-rooted traditional ("Buy Korean") consumption pattern constitute significant impediments to imports.
(a) Import prohibitions Korea replaced a "positive" list with a "negative" list of import (export) approval requirements in 1997. The importation of certain goods may be prohibited or restricted for the protection of public morals, human health, hygiene and sanitation, animal and plant life, environmental conservation or 29 They mainly cover unprocessed agricultural and livestock items, chemicals, bovine leather, woven fabrics and metallic inputs. In some instances, Korea has also structured its indirect tax regime in such a way as to afford protection equivalent to an import tariff. 31 For example, its multi-tiered tax on the sale of alcoholic beverages consists of an ad valorem liquor tax, whose rates vary across various categories of distilled spirits. This tax is supplemented by a surtax on certain of these sales, determined as a percentage of the established liquor tax. Until recently, the outcome was that whiskies, brandies, rum, vodka, tequila, etc., were taxed considerable more than locally-produced alcoholic beverages, notably "soju", with which they competed directly. This resulted in a dispute between Korea and several of its trading partners (the United States, the EU, Canada, and Mexico). 32 As a consequence of this ruling, the Korean Government has raised the tax rate on "soju" from 35% to 75% as of 1 January 2000 so as to bring it into line with the rates levied on other (imported) alcoholic beverages.
As regards imported motor vehicles, not only have they been subject to frugality campaigns, but also their purchase is believed to have triggered tax audits. 33 However, the authorities deny that tax audits have ever been conducted to dissuade taxpayers from purchasing imported cars; indeed, in May 1997, tax officials were instructed to refrain from any administrative action that might be interpreted as an attempt to discourage imports.
(f) Government procurement Government procurement practices may also discriminate against imports. Insofar as local suppliers are favoured over suppliers located abroad, by means of explicit price preference margins or discriminatory tendering, such practices can have effects equivalent to import tariffs as far as government purchases are concerned. These effects may be mitigated insofar as the private sector purchases the imported goods displaced by preferential government procurement practices.
In 1999 the total Korean government procurement market for goods, services and construction was estimated at around W 43.7 trillion (US$43 billion). Procurement by entities covered by the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) represented 77.2% of this market, which is dominated by construction contracts. Notwithstanding the GPA, which operates on a reciprocal basis and covers contracts by entities contained in the signatory's schedule of commitments, foreign suppliers captured less than 5% of the procurement market (mainly involving goods), with the United States and the EU accounting for the largest individual shares. This small share is partly due 31 An excise tax levied on a good that is not produced domestically is equivalent to a tariff. 32 In September 1998, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO adopted the Panel Report, which found that such dissimilar taxation of like products violated Article III of the GATT 1994 and constituted protection to domestic production. to a shift from open to single tendering and a policy favouring domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly in provincial towns; indeed, the share of SMEs in the government procurement market has grown from 30% to 57% since 1997. 34 In areas not covered by the GPA, the Government tends to favour domestic suppliers of goods and services (as in the case of the construction of the new Inchon International Airport, for example). (h) Frugality campaigns
In the face of 1996 balance-of-payments difficulties, the financial crisis and the subsequent IMF stabilisation package, frugality campaigns have been directed at individual consumption of imported "luxury goods" (e.g. motor vehicles, sports equipment cosmetics, fashion items, home appliances, beef, cigarettes, whiskey) and foreign travel. While these campaigns have been suspended in recent years, foreign business interests remain the targets of domestic non-governmental groups;the Government has officially denied that it is involved in these campaigns 35 2000) ).
Although the post-crisis structural reforms have expanded the scope for competition, given the short period that has elapsed since their introduction, and the wide, complex and interdependent links between major domestic economic agents, the full impact of major structural reforms has yet to be felt; both the chaebols and state-owned enterprises with cross-sectoral and overseas presence still appear to be virtually untouched by reforms.
(j)
Other NTBs
Border measures may be reinforced or replaced by less transparent internal measures with similar import restricting effects, as in the case of beef or pharmaceuticals, for example. Imports of beef are already subject to quantitative restrictions. In addition, under Korea's current retail sales system, imported beef may be sold only in officially designated stores (i.e. "imported beef" stores rather than "domestic beef" stores). While the authorities maintain that the system is aimed at fighting fraud (i.e.
ensuring that cheap foreign meat is not sold as domestic meat) and does not affect trade in beef, it may nonetheless impede the sale of imported beef. Interestingly, between 1996 and 1998, the number of the "imported beef" stores declined from 7,569 to 5,498. Furthermore, while beef imports are to be liberalised (so that there will no longer be government involvement in the beef trade) as of January 2001, at the same time, a further measure differentiating imported beef from domestic beef will be applied. As of August 1999 a new pharmaceuticals policy has, inter alia, allowed for imported products to be listed on the national reimbursement schedule, thus reducing the scope of non-tariff barriers to foreign medicines.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The foregoing discussion of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) in Korea highlights several key features of its present trade regime. First and foremost, the customs tariff remains the main instrument of Korea's trade policy. Compared to other major industrialised countries, it accords a high average level of protection -the average applied MFN tariff is currently nearly 14%. It also contains a considerable number of tariff "spikes", particularly as far as agricultural products are concerned, largely as a result of the "tariffication" exercise. At the same time, the tariff embodies a certain degree of escalation. Consequently, the customs tariff is a potentially serious distortion to competition and thus an obstacle to the efficient allocation of domestic resources. With its multiplicity of rates, it is also a highly complex instrument, although its complexity has been reduced by virtue of tariff reductions on industrial items in 1997, which mean that nearly two-thirds of all tariff lines are now subject to a rate of 8% rate. Moreover, applied tariff rates currently fall short of bound rates by an average of 6.3 percentage points. The consequent, albeit declining, gap between bound and applied rates provides considerable scope for the authorities to raise applied MFN tariff, either by increasing general rates or by occasionally levying "flexible" tariffs, thereby imparting a considerable degree of uncertainty to the applied tariff. Furthermore, so-called "autonomous" tariff quotas (mainly for raw materials and inputs) are used in addition to WTO-related agricultural tariff quotas.
As regards NTBs, those concerning agricultural items persist. However, the scope of NTBs affecting industrial products has been considerably reduced, particularly those involving prohibitions, contingency measures, potentially discriminatory standards and government procurement practices.
Action in the context of structural reforms and enforcement of fair competition rules has also been taken so as reduce barriers to trade arising from the operations of state-owned firms and the large domestic business conglomerates (chaebols).
Finally, one should bear in mind that the tariffs and NTBs discussed in this paper pertain largely to border measures. In order to draw firm conclusions regarding Korea's overall trade regime, one obviously needs to take into account not just border measures, but also internal government actions that distort trade and resource allocation. Such actions include other forms of government assistance, notably the wide use of tax concessions and soft loans, as well as remaining restraints on foreign investment in a number of areas.
38 
